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On 12 May 1975, the SS Mayaguez , an American-flagged 
container ship transiting the Gulf of Siam, was seized by forces of 
the Cambodian Khymer Rouge navy and the forty-man crew 
taken captive.  Acting in response to orders from Commander-in-
Chief Gerald Ford, US military forces were committed to recover 
the ship and crew and to engage in retaliatory bombing of targets 
on the Cambodian mainland.  The result was the first helicopter 
assault operation in Air Force history, as USAF Special Operations 
and Combat Rescue H-53s inserted a reinforced rifle company of 
Marines on to Koh Tang, the small island where the Mayaguez 's 
crew was erroneously believed to be held.  
 
By mid-morning on the 15th, the Mayaguez and her crew had 
been repatriated and the operation was hailed as a victory for the 
Ford administration.  That notwithstanding, the Marines found 
themselves fighting a well-armed and determined foe who 
significantly outnumbered them and were extracted only well 
after dark and with great difficulty.  The Ford administration's 
sanguine interpretation of the results to the contrary, the military 
personnel involved in the action considered it a failure -- indeed, 
a near-catastrophe tactically -- and a complete disaster in senior 
leadership and command and control.   The failure prompted 
major interest in altering organizational structures within the 
Department of Defense, although no significant changes were 
embraced until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.     
 
To determine whether or not the failures encountered in the 
Mayaguez /Koh Tang operation were caused by inherent 
structural organizational problems, the presenters -- an Air Force 
Special Operations MH-53J pilot, an Air Force Combat Rescue 
HH-60G pilot, an Army UH-60 pilot, and an Air Force Special 
Operations MC-130P pilot -- analyzed the incident by applying 
Jay Galbraith's Star Model, Bolman and Deal's Frames Model and 
Mintzberg's Five Types of Organizations.  Although these models 
are typically used to analyze business processes, the presenters 
applied them to the operational military problems under 
consideration under the rubric of Organizational Theory.  They 
discovered that Organizational Theory is applicable not only to 
business, but at least equally applicable to military matters in 
affording new perspectives on how to gain lessons from success 
and failure in the operational arena.  Their presentation, using 
the factual framework from Ohio State Professor John 
Guilmartin's study, A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the 
Battle of Koh Tang (1995), shows that these perspectives can be 
applied outside of operations to the highest levels of government, 
to include the Executive Level.  
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